Last reviewed on October 31, 2026.
The cognitive revolution was the shift in psychology, beginning in the 1950s, away from behaviourism’s focus on observable behaviour and towards the scientific study of mental processes. Memory, attention, language and reasoning became legitimate subjects for experiments again, described as forms of information processing. This article covers that transition: why it happened, who drove it and whether “revolution” is the right word. For the whole field, from ancient philosophy to large language models, see our history of cognitive science.
Key facts
- What: a shift in psychology, starting in the 1950s, away from behaviourism and toward the scientific study of the mind.
- Main focus: the cognitive revolution created an impetus for psychologists to focus their attention on better understanding mental processes — memory, attention, perception, language, problem solving and reasoning — treated as information processing.
- Key figures: Noam Chomsky, George Miller, Jerome Bruner, Allen Newell, Herbert Simon, Ulric Neisser.
- Symbolic starting point: 11 September 1956, the second day of a symposium on information theory at MIT. The date is George Miller’s own choice.
- Legacy: cognitive psychology and the interdisciplinary field of cognitive science.
Pre-Revolution Psychology
From about 1913 to the 1950s, behaviourism dominated American experimental psychology. John B. Watson launched it, and B. F. Skinner became its best-known later advocate. It held that psychology should explain behaviour through observable stimuli and responses, not through unobservable mental causes such as thoughts and intentions. This produced rigorous methods, but it struggled to explain language learning, problem solving and mental imagery.
Behaviourism was never the whole of psychology. Miller (2003) recalled that the mind had not disappeared from social or clinical psychology, and that it was mainly experimentalists in the United States who expected behaviourism to work. Even within animal learning, Edward Tolman (1948) argued that rats build “cognitive maps”.
Seeds of Change
The transition from behaviourism to the cognitive approach was gradual, and much of the pressure came from outside psychology:
- Cybernetics and information theory: In 1948 Norbert Wiener published Cybernetics and Claude Shannon published his theory of information. Their work on feedback, control and information suggested that minds and machines could both be described as information processors.
- Advances in computing: The work of Alan Turing, John von Neumann and others on digital computers gave psychologists both a metaphor for the mind and a tool for modelling it.
- Linguistics: Noam Chomsky’s 1959 review of Skinner’s Verbal Behavior (1957) argued that conditioning could not explain how children acquire language, and that they must bring rich innate structure to the task, an idea later developed as universal grammar. The review was very influential, but it was also one-sided: Kenneth MacCorquodale (1970) replied that it attacked a version of behaviourism Skinner did not hold, and how much of grammar is innate is still debated.
- Early AI: Allen Newell and Herbert Simon built computer programs (the Logic Theorist, then the General Problem Solver) that proved theorems and solved puzzles, showing that some complex problem solving could be mechanised.
- Cognitive psychology: George Miller (1956) reviewed evidence for limits on how much information people can judge and hold in mind, and showed that recoding items into “chunks” gets round those limits. His “seven, plus or minus two” is still widely quoted, although Cowan (2001) argued that the true limit, once rehearsal and chunking are excluded, is nearer four. Donald Broadbent (attention) and Jerome Bruner (concept formation) also revived experimental work on mental processes, and Ulric Neisser’s 1967 book Cognitive Psychology drew these findings together. The title was not new, since T. V. Moore had published a book called Cognitive Psychology in 1939 (Surprenant & Neath, 1997), but Neisser’s was the one that shaped the field.
The Rise of Cognitive Science
As psychologists adopted mental representations and information-processing models, they began working with computer scientists, linguists, philosophers and anthropologists. The term cognitive science is usually traced to Christopher Longuet-Higgins in 1973. The journal Cognitive Science began in 1977, a report to the Sloan Foundation mapped the field’s six disciplines in 1978, and the Cognitive Science Society was founded in 1979, holding its first conference that August in La Jolla, California.
Cognitive Revolution Timeline
This timeline of cognitivism, the view that the mind is best studied as an information-processing system, covers the transition itself. Our full timeline of cognitive science runs from antiquity to the present.
| Year | Event |
|---|---|
| 1948 | Hixon Symposium: Karl Lashley’s paper on serial order challenges stimulus–response chains. Norbert Wiener publishes Cybernetics; Claude Shannon publishes his theory of information. Edward Tolman publishes “Cognitive Maps in Rats and Men”. |
| 1956 | Dartmouth summer workshop on “artificial intelligence”, a term coined in its 1955 proposal. MIT symposium, 11 September: Newell & Simon’s logic machine, Chomsky on grammar, Miller on short-term memory. Miller’s “The Magical Number Seven, Plus or Minus Two”. Bruner, Goodnow & Austin’s A Study of Thinking. |
| 1957 | Chomsky's Syntactic Structures; Skinner's Verbal Behavior. |
| 1958 | Broadbent's Perception and Communication models attention as a filter. |
| 1959 | Chomsky's review of Verbal Behavior argues behaviourism cannot explain language. |
| 1960 | Miller, Galanter & Pribram's Plans and the Structure of Behavior; Bruner and Miller found the Harvard Center for Cognitive Studies. |
| 1967 | Neisser’s Cognitive Psychology becomes the defining textbook of the new field. |
| 1973 | Christopher Longuet-Higgins uses the term “cognitive science”, usually cited as its first use. |
| 1977–1979 | The journal Cognitive Science launches (1977); the Sloan Foundation report maps the field (1978); the Cognitive Science Society is founded and holds its first conference (1979). |
Impact and Legacy
The main effects were these:
- It reintroduced mental constructs (e.g., memory, attention, representation) into scientific discourse.
- It fostered computational modeling as a method for testing theories of mind.
- It inspired research on artificial intelligence, leading to practical applications like expert systems and natural language processing.
- It encouraged interdisciplinary collaboration, giving rise to departments, journals and conferences dedicated to cognitive science.
Was It Really a Revolution?
The name is disputed. Miller (2003) himself called it a counter-revolution, because the first revolution had been behaviourism’s removal of the mind from experimental psychology. Thomas Leahey (1992) argued that the “revolutions” of American psychology are largely myths. There was no sudden overthrow: behaviourist research continued, and behaviour analysis remains in use today, particularly in applied settings. Cognitive psychologists also still rely on behaviour as their data, since reaction times and error rates are behaviour. What changed was what those data were taken to be evidence of. See our guide to research methods in cognitive psychology.
Continuing the Revolution
Many of the questions opened in the 1950s are still open. Researchers still debate symbolic versus connectionist models, and approaches such as predictive processing and embodied cognition challenge the original computer metaphor. Large language models have given the old argument between Chomsky and the learning theorists a new form. For what happened after the 1970s, see the history of cognitive science.
Frequently Asked Questions
What was the cognitive revolution?
The cognitive revolution was the movement, beginning in the 1950s, that brought the mind back into scientific psychology. It replaced behaviourism's exclusive focus on observable stimuli and responses with the study of internal mental processes, modelled as information processing, and it led to cognitive psychology and cognitive science.
What was the main focus of the cognitive revolution?
Its main focus was understanding mental processes: how people perceive, attend, remember, use language, reason and solve problems, rather than behaviour alone.
The cognitive revolution created an impetus for psychologists to focus their attention on better understanding what?
Mental processes. The cognitive revolution created an impetus for psychologists to focus their attention on better understanding mental processes such as memory, attention, language and reasoning.
When did the cognitive revolution happen?
It unfolded mainly between the mid-1950s and the late 1960s. George Miller dated its symbolic beginning to 11 September 1956, the second day of a symposium on information theory at MIT, and Ulric Neisser’s 1967 textbook Cognitive Psychology marked its consolidation.
Who started the cognitive revolution?
No single person started it. Key contributors include Noam Chomsky (linguistics), George Miller and Jerome Bruner (psychology), Allen Newell and Herbert Simon (artificial intelligence), Donald Broadbent (attention) and Ulric Neisser, who synthesised the new field.
Why did the cognitive revolution replace behaviorism?
Behaviourism struggled to explain language, planning, problem solving and memory, all of which seem to require internal representations. The computer offered a rigorous way to describe such representations and processes, making it scientifically respectable to study the mind again.
Sources
- Chomsky, N. (1959). Review of Verbal Behavior by B. F. Skinner. Language, 35(1), 26–58. doi:10.2307/411334
- Cowan, N. (2001). The magical number 4 in short-term memory: A reconsideration of mental storage capacity. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 24(1), 87–114. doi:10.1017/S0140525X01003922
- Gardner, H. (1985). The Mind’s New Science: A History of the Cognitive Revolution. Basic Books.
- Leahey, T. H. (1992). The mythical revolutions of American psychology. American Psychologist, 47(2), 308–318. doi:10.1037/0003-066X.47.2.308
- Longuet-Higgins, H. C. (1973). Comments on the Lighthill report and the Sutherland reply. In Artificial Intelligence: A Paper Symposium (pp. 35–37). Science Research Council.
- MacCorquodale, K. (1970). On Chomsky’s review of Skinner’s Verbal Behavior. Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 13(1), 83–99. doi:10.1901/jeab.1970.13-83
- McCarthy, J., Minsky, M. L., Rochester, N., & Shannon, C. E. (1955). A Proposal for the Dartmouth Summer Research Project on Artificial Intelligence. Stanford archive copy
- Miller, G. A. (1956). The magical number seven, plus or minus two: Some limits on our capacity for processing information. Psychological Review, 63(2), 81–97. doi:10.1037/h0043158
- Miller, G. A. (2003). The cognitive revolution: a historical perspective. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 7(3), 141–144. doi:10.1016/S1364-6613(03)00029-9
- Neisser, U. (1967). Cognitive Psychology. Appleton-Century-Crofts.
- Surprenant, A. M., & Neath, I. (1997). T. V. Moore’s (1939) Cognitive Psychology. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 4(3), 342–349. doi:10.3758/BF03210791
- Tolman, E. C. (1948). Cognitive maps in rats and men. Psychological Review, 55(4), 189–208. doi:10.1037/h0061626
- Watson, J. B. (1913). Psychology as the behaviorist views it. Psychological Review, 20(2), 158–177. doi:10.1037/h0074428