Problem Solving and Reasoning in Cognitive Psychology: How It Works

How people, and the field that studies them, work through hard questions.

Last reviewed on October 31, 2026.

Short answer: how does problem solving work?

In cognitive psychology, problem solving is moving from a current state to a goal when the route is not obvious. People represent the problem, then search for a route using heuristics such as means-ends analysis or analogy to a familiar case, and sometimes restructure the problem in a moment of insight. Reasoning is drawing conclusions from what you know, by deduction, induction or abduction. People are limited by working memory and by how a problem is presented, so the framing of a problem often matters as much as its logic.

The article on decision making and cognitive biases covers the part of thinking where a person picks among options under uncertainty. This page covers working through a problem when the answer is not in front of you, the path is not obvious and several false starts are likely. It introduces the main concepts, the problems that have shaped the research, and the distinction between reasoning by rule and reasoning by example.

Problems, search and the cost of thinking

The classical framing comes from the work of Allen Newell and Herbert Simon (1972), and it still organises much of the field. A problem is defined by an initial state, a goal state, and a set of operators that transform one state into another. Solving the problem is a search through the space of states reachable by applying operators.

Three things follow from this framing.

Insight: when the problem suddenly looks different

Some problems do not yield to incremental search. They yield to a sudden restructuring — the moment when "oh, it's a triangle, not a square" turns a hard problem into an easy one. The Gestalt psychologists called this insight, and it has been studied with classic puzzles: the nine-dot problem, the candle problem (Duncker, 1945), the matchstick arithmetic task (Knoblich et al., 1999). What these tasks have in common is that the obvious framing is wrong, and progress requires abandoning it.

Two well-documented barriers show why that is hard. In functional fixedness, people struggle to use an object in an unfamiliar way, as when they fail to see a box of tacks as a candle shelf (Duncker, 1945). In mental set, a method that worked before keeps being applied even when a simpler one is available, as in Luchins’ (1942) water-jar problems.

Insight has resisted easy explanation. Some researchers treat it as ordinary search through a poorly-structured space; others argue it requires a distinct mechanism — a sudden change in the way the problem is represented. A meta-analysis found that incubation (setting a problem aside) helps overall, but the benefit depends on the task and the conditions, and is larger for divergent thinking than for insight puzzles (Sio & Ormerod, 2009). People in a more positive mood solved more problems by insight in one study (Subramaniam et al., 2009), and the "aha" experience has distinct patterns of brain activity (Jung-Beeman et al., 2004; Kounios & Beeman, 2014). There is much less consensus on what process produces the restructuring.

Analogy: solving by precedent

Much of human reasoning is not from first principles but from prior cases. A doctor who has seen this pattern of symptoms before is doing something different from a doctor reasoning out the differential diagnosis from scratch. A programmer who recognises a problem as "essentially graph traversal" has done most of the work just by mapping the new problem to a familiar one. Analogical reasoning is the cognitive science term for this transfer.

The research, much of it associated with Dedre Gentner (1983) and Keith Holyoak, has converged on a few robust observations.

Deduction, induction and the limits of pure logic

Reasoning by rule is the part of cognition where philosophy and cognitive science most obviously meet. The classical distinctions are old and useful.

Cognitive science has shown, repeatedly, that human reasoners do not closely follow formal logic when it diverges from the way the problem is naturally interpreted. The Wason selection task (Wason, 1968) is the canonical example: most people get an abstract version wrong, but many get a similar version right when it is framed as a social rule, such as checking who is breaking a drinking-age law (Griggs & Cox, 1982). Why this happens is disputed. Cosmides (1989) proposed a specialised ability for detecting cheaters; Oaksford and Chater (1994) argued that people’s answers are sensible if they treat the abstract task as a question of gathering useful evidence, not as a test of formal logic. Either way, what looks like the same problem to a logician is not the same problem to a person solving it.

A worked example: the Tower of Hanoi

The Tower of Hanoi puzzle — three pegs, several discs of different sizes, move them all from one peg to another without ever putting a larger disc on a smaller one — illustrates several of the ideas at once.

A naïve solver searches forward: try a move, see what happens, try another. With three discs, this works. With seven, the shortest solution takes 127 moves and a solver without a strategy can easily get lost. A classic heuristic is means-ends analysis (Newell & Simon, 1972; Simon, 1975): identify the difference between the current state and the goal, find an operator that reduces it, and apply it. If applying it requires a precondition that does not hold, set up a sub-goal to make the precondition hold first. Means-ends analysis turns a search problem into a recursive plan.

The same problem also illustrates analogy. A solver who sees that the seven-disc problem reduces to "move the top six elsewhere, move the bottom disc, then move the six back" has noticed a structural pattern that the three-disc version trained them on. The puzzle is much easier once the pattern is named.

Common mistakes when reading problem-solving research

Where this connects on the site

Reasoning sits between several other topics. The mechanisms that make a heuristic feel right are studied as cognitive biases; the memory systems that supply prior cases for analogy are themselves an active research area; the AI attempt to build systems that reason has both inspired and been inspired by this part of cognitive science. The disciplines overview gives the surrounding context, and the glossary defines the key terms used here.

Frequently Asked Questions

What is problem solving in cognitive psychology?

It is the process of getting from a current state to a goal when the way there is not obvious. Newell and Simon described it as search through a space of possible states, using operators that change one state into another.

What is the difference between problem solving and reasoning?

Problem solving is about reaching a goal; reasoning is about drawing conclusions from what you already know. The two overlap, because solving a problem usually involves reasoning along the way.

What are the main problem-solving strategies?

Algorithms guarantee a solution if followed, but can be slow. Heuristics are quicker rules of thumb, including means-ends analysis, working backward from the goal, and analogy to a problem you have solved before.

What is the difference between deductive, inductive and abductive reasoning?

Deduction draws conclusions that must be true if the premises are true. Induction generalises from cases, so its conclusions can be wrong. Abduction infers the best explanation of an observation.

What is insight in problem solving?

Insight is the sudden restructuring of a problem so that a solution becomes clear, often experienced as an “aha” moment. Researchers still disagree on whether it is ordinary search or a distinct process.

What gets in the way of solving problems?

Common barriers are a poor representation of the problem, functional fixedness (seeing an object only in its usual use), mental set (repeating a method that worked before) and the limits of working memory.

Why do people get the Wason selection task wrong?

Most people choose the cards that could confirm a rule instead of those that could break it. Performance improves with social rules such as drinking-age laws, and researchers disagree on why.

Sources

  1. Newell, A., & Simon, H. A. (1972). Human Problem Solving. Prentice-Hall.
  2. Simon, H. A. (1975). The functional equivalence of problem solving skills. Cognitive Psychology, 7(2), 268–288. doi:10.1016/0010-0285(75)90012-2
  3. Kotovsky, K., Hayes, J. R., & Simon, H. A. (1985). Why are some problems hard? Evidence from Tower of Hanoi. Cognitive Psychology, 17(2), 248–294. doi:10.1016/0010-0285(85)90009-X
  4. Duncker, K. (1945). On problem-solving. Psychological Monographs, 58(5), i–113. doi:10.1037/h0093599
  5. Luchins, A. S. (1942). Mechanization in problem solving: the effect of Einstellung. Psychological Monographs, 54(6), i–95. doi:10.1037/h0093502
  6. Knoblich, G., Ohlsson, S., Haider, H., & Rhenius, D. (1999). Constraint relaxation and chunk decomposition in insight problem solving. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 25(6), 1534–1555. doi:10.1037/0278-7393.25.6.1534
  7. Sio, U. N., & Ormerod, T. C. (2009). Does incubation enhance problem solving? A meta-analytic review. Psychological Bulletin, 135(1), 94–120. doi:10.1037/a0014212
  8. Subramaniam, K., Kounios, J., Parrish, T. B., & Jung-Beeman, M. (2009). A brain mechanism for facilitation of insight by positive affect. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 21(3), 415–432. doi:10.1162/jocn.2009.21057
  9. Jung-Beeman, M., et al. (2004). Neural activity when people solve verbal problems with insight. PLoS Biology, 2(4), e97. doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.0020097
  10. Kounios, J., & Beeman, M. (2014). The cognitive neuroscience of insight. Annual Review of Psychology, 65(1), 71–93. doi:10.1146/annurev-psych-010213-115154
  11. Gentner, D. (1983). Structure-mapping: a theoretical framework for analogy. Cognitive Science, 7(2), 155–170. doi:10.1207/s15516709cog0702_3
  12. Gick, M. L., & Holyoak, K. J. (1980). Analogical problem solving. Cognitive Psychology, 12(3), 306–355. doi:10.1016/0010-0285(80)90013-4
  13. Gick, M. L., & Holyoak, K. J. (1983). Schema induction and analogical transfer. Cognitive Psychology, 15(1), 1–38. doi:10.1016/0010-0285(83)90002-6
  14. Gentner, D., Loewenstein, J., & Thompson, L. (2003). Learning and transfer: a general role for analogical encoding. Journal of Educational Psychology, 95(2), 393–408. doi:10.1037/0022-0663.95.2.393
  15. Alfieri, L., Nokes-Malach, T. J., & Schunn, C. D. (2013). Learning through case comparisons: a meta-analytic review. Educational Psychologist, 48(2), 87–113. doi:10.1080/00461520.2013.775712
  16. Wason, P. C. (1968). Reasoning about a rule. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 20(3), 273–281. doi:10.1080/14640746808400161
  17. Griggs, R. A., & Cox, J. R. (1982). The elusive thematic-materials effect in Wason’s selection task. British Journal of Psychology, 73(3), 407–420. doi:10.1111/j.2044-8295.1982.tb01823.x
  18. Cosmides, L. (1989). The logic of social exchange: has natural selection shaped how humans reason? Studies with the Wason selection task. Cognition, 31(3), 187–276. doi:10.1016/0010-0277(89)90023-1
  19. Oaksford, M., & Chater, N. (1994). A rational analysis of the selection task as optimal data selection. Psychological Review, 101(4), 608–631. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.101.4.608
  20. Chase, W. G., & Simon, H. A. (1973). Perception in chess. Cognitive Psychology, 4(1), 55–81. doi:10.1016/0010-0285(73)90004-2