Last reviewed on October 31, 2026.
Short answer: what is consciousness?
Consciousness is subjective experience: what it is like to see red, taste coffee or feel pain. In cognitive science the word covers three things: being awake, having information available to report and act on, and the felt quality of experience. No theory is agreed. The main candidates are global workspace theory, integrated information theory, higher-order theories and predictive processing accounts, and the largest head-to-head test so far, published in 2025, challenged key claims of the two it compared.
People notice that something is happening when they see red, taste coffee or feel embarrassed, and they want a science that takes that seriously. But "consciousness" picks out at least three different questions, and the methods of cognitive science answer them unevenly. This page sets out the main distinctions, the leading theories, the recent attempts to test them against each other, and the limits of what current tools can measure.
Three things the word "consciousness" can mean
Much of the confusion about consciousness research clears once the term is split. Three uses are worth keeping separate.
- Wakefulness. The state of being alert and responsive, as opposed to being in deep sleep, under anaesthesia or in a coma. Wakefulness is studied by clinicians and sleep researchers and can be measured with EEG and behavioural tests. It is the most tractable sense of "conscious."
- Access consciousness. A term from the philosopher Ned Block (1995): information being available for report, reasoning and the control of action. If you can describe what you just saw, integrate it with your goals or use it to choose a response, that information is access-conscious. This is the sense most cognitive psychology actually targets.
- Phenomenal consciousness. The qualitative, felt character of experience — what it is like to see red, to taste coffee, to feel a sharp pain. The philosopher Thomas Nagel (1974) framed it as the question of whether there is "something it is like" to be the system in question.
Most experimental work studies wakefulness and access consciousness because those produce measurable behaviour. Phenomenal consciousness is what raises the philosophical heat.
The easy and hard problems
The philosopher David Chalmers (1995) proposed a useful split between the "easy problems" of consciousness and the "hard problem." The label "easy" is misleading — the easy problems are not easy in any practical sense. They are easy only in the sense that the existing toolkit of cognitive science can in principle address them.
The easy problems include explaining how the brain integrates information across modalities, how attention selects what becomes reportable, how memory makes prior experience available, how the system distinguishes self from environment, and how it produces verbal reports of its own states. These are difficult research projects, but they have the shape of normal scientific questions: a behaviour or a function is identified, mechanisms are proposed, experiments distinguish them.
The hard problem is different. It asks why any of this physical processing is accompanied by subjective experience at all — why a brain that integrates information should not, on the face of it, do its work in the dark. Many cognitive scientists either set the hard problem aside as outside the reach of current methods or argue that it will dissolve once the easy problems are well enough solved. There is no consensus.
Leading theories that researchers actually argue about
Several frameworks compete to explain consciousness, and they do not all aim at the same target: some focus on access, others on experience itself (Seth & Bayne, 2022). Each makes empirical commitments that researchers can test.
Global workspace theory
Proposed by Bernard Baars (1988) and developed in neural form by Stanislas Dehaene and Jean-Pierre Changeux (2011), global workspace theory treats consciousness as the broadcast of information across a wide network of brain regions. On this view, much of cognition runs in parallel, modular processes; an item becomes consciously accessible when it is selected and made available to many modules at once, particularly fronto-parietal networks. The theory predicts characteristic neural signatures around the time a stimulus crosses the threshold of awareness, and a substantial body of imaging work has been organised around testing those predictions.
Higher-order theories
Higher-order theories, associated with David Rosenthal, Hakwan Lau and others (Lau & Rosenthal, 2011), hold that a mental state becomes conscious when it is itself the object of a higher-order representation — a thought about that state. On this view, awareness requires not just information being processed but information being represented as one's own. Critics argue that it is hard to find clear neural correlates for higher-order representations distinct from the lower-order ones; defenders argue that distinguishing the two is precisely the empirical project.
Integrated information theory
Integrated information theory (IIT), developed by Giulio Tononi (2004; Albantakis et al., 2023 for the current version), takes the unusual step of starting from the structure of experience itself and asking what physical substrates could produce it. It proposes that consciousness corresponds to the amount of integrated information ("phi") a system generates above and beyond the sum of its parts. IIT is mathematically elaborate and has some surprising implications, including that very simple systems could have minimal consciousness. Critics consider this a serious problem; defenders consider it a consequence of taking experience as the starting point.
Predictive processing accounts
Some researchers have argued that consciousness should be understood within a predictive processing framework — that conscious experience corresponds to the brain's current best hypothesis about the causes of its sensory input, integrated at a particular timescale. This is less a single theory than a family of proposals that try to anchor experience to the same machinery used to model perception and action (Hohwy & Seth, 2020).
Testing the theories: the IIT versus global workspace collaboration
Most theories of consciousness have gathered evidence separately, each with its own favoured experiments. The Cogitate Consortium tried something different: an adversarial collaboration, in which proponents of IIT and of global neuronal workspace theory (GNWT) worked with theory-neutral researchers to agree in advance on experiments, predictions and how results would be interpreted (Melloni et al., 2023). First results were presented in June 2023 at a meeting of the Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness in New York, and the peer-reviewed paper appeared in Nature in 2025 (Cogitate Consortium et al., 2025).
In the study, 256 participants viewed clearly visible stimuli for different durations while their brain activity was recorded with fMRI, MEG or intracranial EEG. Neither theory won. The results fitted some predictions of each while, in the authors’ words, “substantially challenging key tenets of both”:
- For IIT: there was no sustained synchronisation within the posterior cortex, which contradicts the claim that network connectivity specifies consciousness.
- For GNWT: there was generally no “ignition” when the stimulus ended, and the prefrontal cortex represented only some conscious content.
The 2023 meeting also settled a bet. In 1998 the neuroscientist Christof Koch wagered wine with David Chalmers that a clear neural correlate of consciousness would be found within 25 years. Koch conceded (Lenharo, 2023a).
The “pseudoscience” dispute
Press coverage of the 2023 results provoked a sharp response. In September 2023, 124 researchers posted a letter on the PsyArXiv preprint server calling IIT pseudoscience. Their objections centred on the theory’s links to panpsychism and on whether the theory as a whole can be tested, and they disputed its description as a “leading” theory (Lenharo, 2023b). Many others in the field objected to the label. Chalmers, who sees many problems in IIT, said the label was a disproportionate response.
The argument moved into the journals in 2025. In Nature Neuroscience, a large group of authors argued that IIT’s core claims are untestable even in principle (IIT-Concerned et al., 2025). Tononi and colleagues (2025) replied that IIT starts from experience and assesses it in testable terms, and that the label reflects a clash with the dominant computational-functionalist view of mind. The two sides are arguing about different things: experiments like Cogitate test specific predictions, while the pseudoscience charge concerns the theory’s core claims. The dispute remains open.
Attention and consciousness are not the same
It is tempting to conflate consciousness with attention. They are related but distinct. Some experimental work, particularly using brief or masked stimuli, suggests (Koch & Tsuchiya, 2007) that information can be attended to without being reported as conscious, and that some conscious experience can occur outside the focus of attention. The exact dissociation is contested, but the lesson is that "I noticed it" and "I was aware of it" are not always the same claim. This matters for interpreting any study that uses verbal report as the gold standard for consciousness.
What current methods can and cannot measure
Cognitive neuroscience has developed several methods for finding the neural correlates of consciousness — the brain activity that reliably accompanies a particular conscious experience. Common designs include:
- Binocular rivalry. Two different images are shown to the two eyes; perception alternates between them while the physical input is constant. Brain activity that tracks what is consciously seen, rather than what is being shown, is a candidate correlate.
- Masking experiments. A stimulus is shown briefly and then "masked" by another. By varying the timing, researchers can find conditions where participants do or do not report seeing it.
- No-report paradigms. Because asking for a report may itself drive frontal activity (Frässle et al., 2014), researchers have tried to identify correlates of awareness without explicit reports, often using physiological measures such as pupil response or eye movements (Tsuchiya et al., 2015).
- Anaesthesia and disorders of consciousness. Comparing brain activity across wakefulness, sleep, sedation and clinical disorders helps identify the neural signatures that drop out when consciousness does.
What these methods deliver are correlates: patterns of activity that occur alongside conscious experience (Koch et al., 2016). Establishing that a correlate is necessary, sufficient or causal requires more — typically interventions such as TMS or pharmacological manipulation, both of which carry their own interpretive constraints. The discussion of these tools is on the research methods page.
Common mistakes when reading consciousness research
- Treating "consciousness" as one thing. A study that finds an effect on access consciousness has not thereby said anything direct about phenomenal consciousness. Watch for a paper that switches senses between abstract and conclusion.
- Confusing correlation with explanation. A reliable neural correlate is a starting point for theory, not a theory in itself. The correlate is what needs explaining.
- Reading dramatic claims about thresholds. Boundaries between "conscious" and "unconscious" processing are often gradient, not binary. A claim that something is "subliminal" or "supraliminal" depends on the measure used and the criterion adopted.
- Assuming machines either are or are not conscious. Whether a given AI system has any form of consciousness depends on which sense of the term is in play. This is also discussed in the article on AI and cognitive science.
Why the hesitation is appropriate
Cognitive science has made real progress on the easy problems, especially access consciousness, attention and the neural correlates of awareness. It has not solved the hard problem, and there is no agreed timeline for doing so. The honest answer to "what does cognitive science say about consciousness?" is that it can now test specific claims about how awareness works, and that the deepest question is still open.
To follow related threads on the site, the disciplines page introduces the philosophical and neuroscientific contexts in which the consciousness debate lives, the article on attention and perception covers the closest relative of conscious access, and the glossary gives short definitions for the technical terms used here.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is consciousness in simple terms?
Consciousness is subjective experience: the fact that seeing, hearing, feeling and thinking are like something from the inside. Scientists separate being awake, having information available to report and use, and the felt quality of experience.
What is the hard problem of consciousness?
It is David Chalmers’ name for the question of why physical processing in the brain is accompanied by subjective experience at all. The “easy” problems ask how the brain performs functions such as attention and report; the hard problem asks why those functions feel like anything.
What is the difference between access and phenomenal consciousness?
Access consciousness means information is available for report, reasoning and action. Phenomenal consciousness is the felt character of experience. Ned Block drew the distinction in 1995, and most experiments measure access more directly than experience.
What are the main theories of consciousness?
The most discussed are global workspace theory, integrated information theory, higher-order theories and predictive processing accounts. None is accepted as correct, and they differ in what they are trying to explain.
Did IIT or global workspace theory win the adversarial collaboration?
Neither. The Cogitate study of 256 participants, published in Nature in 2025, supported some predictions of each theory and challenged key claims of both. IIT was challenged by a lack of sustained synchronisation in posterior cortex, and global neuronal workspace theory by a general lack of ignition at stimulus offset.
Why was integrated information theory called pseudoscience?
In 2023, 124 researchers signed a letter using that label, objecting to IIT’s links to panpsychism and arguing that the theory as a whole may not be testable. A 2025 paper repeated the charge that its core claims are untestable. Many researchers rejected the label, and IIT’s authors have replied in print.
Can AI be conscious?
There is no agreed answer, because theories disagree about what consciousness requires and there is no accepted test for it. A system’s ability to talk about experience does not show that it has any.
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